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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping is following up its conciliation on boundary questions with Burma and Nepal with moves to soften its dispute with Indonesia. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi has expressed satisfaction with Djakarta's regrets over last month's incident in which two Overseas Chinese were killed, and he has promised to consider ending Peiping's abusive radio attacks. In addition, Communist China has agreed to the designation of a new Indonesian ambassador who was previously indicated to be unacceptable.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Mali: Discord between leaders of Senegal and Soudan--the constituent states of the newly independent Federation of Mali--is sharpening to such an extent that it could lead to an early break-up of the federation. Senegalese leaders have become increasingly antagonized by Soudanese attempts to dominate the

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federation, and the Soudanese apparently are backing away from an earlier commitment to support Leopold Senghor, Senegal's top leader, for the presidency of Mali in a vote now scheduled for 27 August.

III. THE WEST

Organization of American States: Venezuela is demanding that a resolution calling for a complete break in relations with the Dominican Republic be passed at the first of the two Organization of American States (OAS) meetings beginning 16 August in San Jose, Costa Rica. Peru will support a break in diplomatic relations--a step already taken by Lima--but not a break in commercial relations, according to the American chargé in Lima. At the subsequent meeting on the Cuban issue, which Peru proposed, it will back a strong resolution condemning Sino-Soviet interference in the hemisphere. Unless Cuba makes new attacks on the OAS or on Peru, the Peruvian Government would not, however, want to support a resolution against Cuba.

LATE ITEMS

*Laos: The Revolutionary Committee's announcement in Vientiane that the Somsanith government is on the point of submitting its resignation is unconfirmed, and may be overly optimistic.

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In order to strengthen his hand in any showdown or negotiations with the rebellious units in Vientiane, Phoumi is making urgent plans for the transfer to Savannakhet of the 200 Lao paratroopers in training in Thailand. Meanwhile, the latest communiqués issued by Captain Kong Le, leader of the Revolutionary Committee, are considerably more moderate in tone than those immediately following the take-over of Vientiane on 8 August. They

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assert the Revolutionary Committee's respect for the monarchy and the constitution, and do not give support to press reports to the effect that all American personnel would be expelled from Laos and that Communist bloc assistance would be sought.

Radio Hanoi reports that the pro-Communist Pathet Lao movement has expressed "full support" for the coup group in Vientiane, has proposed the prompt formation of a "national coalition government," and has called for joint action by Lao government and Pathet Lao forces to forestall countermoves by the US and pro-American forces in Laos. (b)(3)

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Peiping Displays Softer Attitude Toward Indonesia

To help dispel an appearance of unreasonableness, Peiping is following up its conciliation on boundary questions with Burma and Nepal with moves to calm its dispute with Djakarta over Indonesian treatment of Overseas Chinese. This dispute was sharpened considerably a month ago when two Overseas Chinese who resisted resettlement measures were killed by Indonesian troops in Tjimahi, West Java. Foreign Minister Chen Yi recently told two Indonesian journalists in Peiping he was satisfied with Djakarta's expression of regret over the incident, and he promised to consider an end to abusive radio attacks which have greatly annoyed the Indonesians. President Sukarno refused for over four weeks to receive the Chinese ambassador, who was eager to present "urgent messages" from Peiping.

Communist China has also agreed to accept the new Indonesian ambassador who it had previously indicated was not welcome. Peiping had stalled on accepting the ambassador, whose name was submitted at the time of the Tjimahi incident, in order to show its displeasure over the Overseas Chinese issue. (b)(3)

Chinese Communist propaganda is pointing to Peiping's ability to resolve disputes with other Asian countries to suggest that Indian rather than Chinese stubbornness is responsible for the impasse in Sino-Indian border negotiations. (b)(1)

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Senegalese-Soudanese Friction Shaking Mali Federation

Discord between Senegal and Soudan--the constituent states of the newly independent Federation of Mali--has recently intensified to such an extent that an early break-up of the federation is possible. This latest and most serious in a series of such crises between the federal partners--whose basic outlooks and temperaments diverge widely--is the result of increasing resentment on the part of the moderate Senegalese over Soudanese attempts to dominate Mali. The Soudanese, whose top leader, Modibo Keita, is foreign minister as well as head of the Mali Government, have been placing a disproportionate number of their people in federal positions. They have also been trying, quite openly, on at least one recent occasion, to induce younger elements in the Senegalese Government to work for the more vigorous domestic policies and the more aggressive, pan-African-oriented foreign policy favored by Soudan.

This heightened friction, already reflected in a wrangle over the naming of a chief of staff for the Mali Army, appears to be building up toward a showdown in connection with the election, now scheduled for 27 August, of a federal president by the combined legislatures of Mali, Senegal, and Soudan. A top-level decision reached last May supposedly cleared the way for the election to this post of Leopold Senghor, Senegal's principal spokesman and the chief architect of the Mali Federation. Now, however, the Soudanese are insisting they agreed only that the presidency should go to a representative of Senegal. (b)(1)

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Senghor's supporters are reacting to these indications with dire predictions implying a possible move by Senegal to secede from the federation if Senghor is not chosen. (b)(1)

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Possible Developments at OAS Meetings

Venezuela is demanding that a resolution calling for a complete break in relations with the Dominican Republic be passed at the first of the two Organization of American States (OAS) meetings beginning 16 August in San Jose, Costa Rica. Peru will support a break in diplomatic relations--a step already taken by Lima--but not a break in commercial relations, according to the US chargé in Lima. At the subsequent meeting on the Cuban issue, which Peru proposed, it will back a strong resolution condemning Sino-Soviet interference in the hemisphere. Unless Cuba makes new attacks on the OAS or Peru, the Peruvian Government would not, however, want to support a resolution against Cuba.

The Trujillo regime now has no supporters among the Latin American states. In its propaganda efforts and in the statements of its officials, it is showing a bitterness against the United States which, in many aspects, closely parallels that of the Castro regime in Cuba. The two regimes, heretofore generally considered at opposite ideological poles, may well find themselves allies at the foreign ministers' meetings. In a letter to air force officers prior to his departure for Europe on 7 August, General "Ramfis" Trujillo, the dictator's son, stated that the United States has turned against both Trujillo and Castro because both attacked US business interests--"When those people's dollars and cents are touched, no one can shut them up." The American Embassy interprets the letter, a bitter tirade against the United States, as clear indication that dictator Trujillo intends to retain control and that he is "to some extent at least sympathetic to Castro."

Communists and other pro-Castro groups in Costa Rica are evidently planning disturbances during the conference, including picketing the conference site and holding public meetings denouncing the OAS. However, there is no large group of dissatisfied individuals in the Costa Rican capital that would be readily exploitable in mob action, and any disturbances are likely to be carried out by individuals and small groups which could be controlled by Costa Rica's 2,400-man civil security force. The American Embassy reported on 11 August that minor disturbances are probable and violence is possible, but either will probably be controlled

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Situation in Laos

Emissaries continue to shuttle back and forth between the Somsanith government temporarily seated in Luang Prabang and the Revolutionary Committee holding forth in Vientiane, but these indirect negotiations thus far have been inconclusive. Claims by the Revolutionary Committee that the government is about to tender its resignation are unsubstantiated and may be overly optimistic. Government leaders may be stalling for time in order to assess their political and military strength throughout the country before entering into serious negotiations or initiating possible military counteraction.

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There are growing signs that Captain Kong Le, leader of the coup group, is operating on a shoestring and is attempting to stampede the government into a quick settlement before his situation becomes readily apparent. His exhortations over the Vientiane radio for the Lao people to rise up and support his reform movement have evoked no discernible response thus far from either civil or military quarters outside Vientiane. Rebel strength in Vientiane is about 1,200 men, but all of these apparently are not strongly loyal to Kong Le. The troops, fatigued

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from practically continuous duty since 8 August, are becoming shabby and are on short rations: (b)(1)

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The latest communiqués issued by the Revolutionary Committee are considerably more moderate than its initial statements following the takeover on 8 August. It announced on 12 August that the term "Revolutionary Committee" is inappropriate, and that "coup d'etat committee" is preferable inasmuch as the committee has no desire to change the system of administration and fully respects the king and constitution. It also stressed that no political group or foreign nation was behind the coup. Press reports to the effect that all American personnel would be expelled from Laos and that Communist bloc assistance would be sought were termed "completely unfounded."

The situation in Vientiane is outwardly calm, but food supplies are dwindling and the Revolutionary Committee has warned merchants against hiking prices. Rumors are rife, and a local USIS employee reports that the people believe the "Communists" have taken over the town.

The Communists are exploiting these developments. According to Radio Hanoi, the dissident Pathet Lao movement has voiced "full support" for the coup group in Vientiane, has proposed the prompt formation of a "national coalition government," and has called for joint action by the Lao government and Pathet Lao forces to forestall countermoves by the US and pro-American forces in Laos. Hanoi has lauded the policy of "peace and neutrality" proclaimed by Kong Le and has assured the Laotian people of the "sympathy and support of peace-loving people throughout the world." Peiping, breaking almost three days' silence on the coup, has begun to carry extensive reports on the situation in Laos. Moscow radio comments that events in Laos are another expression of the process taking place in various countries linked to the United States by "aggressive military blocs."

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Moscow could be expected to accompany such demands by offers of economic and technical assistance to the Congo Government, despite disclaimers by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to Hammarskjold on 10 August that the Soviet Union would be willing--in contrast with normal Soviet policy--to channel its aid to the Congo through the UN. (b)(3)
) The Soviet Union has already provided some direct aid (b)(3)
in the form of food, medical assistance, and one transport aircraft.

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